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NATIONAL INTERESTS
Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?
James F. Miskel
It has become virtually a matter of faith among statesmen and academics thatforeign policy is best made when national interests are clearly defined and ar-
ticulated.1 How best to define and prioritize national interests can, of course, be
a matter of considerable dispute. Thus the controversies that swirled around
U.S. policy toward Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, have been sometimes un-
derstood as reflections of fundamental disagreement about how U.S. national
interests in the Balkans should be defined and prioritized relative to other na-
tional interests in the region and other parts of the world. Implicit in these and
similar debates about national interests and foreign policy are two assumptions.
One is that national interests can be defined precisely. This assumption is obvi-
ously true, although actually defining and prioritizing specific interests may be
rather difficult in the contemporary era, with growing interdependence among
nations and no superpower competition. The second assumption is that states-
men actually attempt to define national interests with
precision. Judging from recent history, this assump-
tion warrants challenge.
At least in recent years, statesmen have been reluc-
tant to define national interests with anything other
than Delphic ambiguity. Like the ancient Greek ora-
cle, famous for its double-entendre predictions and
deliberately obscure advice, today’s statesmen rou-
tinely offer “definitions” of the national interest so
broad that they can be, and in fact are, interpreted in
more than one way and in any case reveal little about
the actual long-range goals of the nation.
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Very generally speaking, there are two basic schools of thought about how na-
tional interests should be defined. One school, the avatars of which might be re-
alist statesmen like Otto von Bismarck in the nineteenth century and Richard
Nixon in the twentieth, holds that national interests should be defined in terms
of a state’s tangible power and sphere of influence relative to those of other
states. The single most important form of tangible power for this realist school is
military (cannons and rifles in Bismarck’s era, nuclear missiles and bombers in
Nixon’s); the statesman’s ultimate challenge is to maintain a balance of military
power that is favorable to his or her state. Hence, realists tend to believe that the
United States has no important national interests at stake in places like Bosnia
and Kosovo, because events there have only a marginal effect on the global dis-
tribution of military power.
The other school holds that national interests should be defined more
broadly to encompass intangible, but nevertheless highly prized, values like hu-
man rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and freedom from disease. In
their vastly different ways, Woodrow Wilson and V. I. Lenin might be thought of
as exemplars of this school. Both leaders employed the military power of their
states to promote, respectively, the values of national self-determination and
economic egalitarianism. Advocates of American military action in Bosnia and
Kosovo, for instance, tended to argue that events in the Balkans are direct af-
fronts to important intangible values and thus must be confronted. They further
argued, perhaps as a sop to realists, that if Washington had ignored them, the
ability of the United States to wield “soft power” in other areas would have grad-
ually eroded.
For the last century, the foreign policies of the United States and many other
countries have been largely shaped by the decisions of statesmen who have
charted courses in the middle ground between the two national-interest
schools. This hundred-year database suggests that there has been a collective, al-
beit unexpressed, judgment by practitioners that neither school has it exactly
right. It also suggests that whatever they say in public, practitioners have realized
that attempts to define national interests in enough detail to serve as actual
guides for foreign policy are, all too often, frustrating and ultimately sterile
exercises.
Why, then, are Delphic bows toward the altar of national interest virtually de
rigueur in public policy and academic circles? The reason, to the cynic’s mind, is
that justifying decisions on the basis of supposed relationships to national inter-
ests—even vaguely defined national interests—is both intellectually and senti-
mentally gratifying. Obligatory tips of the hat to the national interest have
intellectual appeal in that they appear to validate the expectation of scholars,
legislators, and voters that statesmen will base their decisions on reasoned
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evaluations of the connection between ends and means. After all, without a clear
picture of the ends—national interests—objective comparisons of alternative
courses of action would be (and, as importantly, would be perceived by voters as
being) little more than guesswork.
Allusions to the national interests are sentimentally attractive because they
reaffirm the presumption that the expenditures and exertions that result from
strategic decisions are made for worthy purposes. Even in nondemocratic
regimes, creating the sense that
worthwhile ends are being served
is often vital to the mobilization
of national effort. Domestic polit-
ical support from key interest
groups, if not from the popula-
tion as a whole, is often the sine
qua non of successful policy im-
plementation, regardless of the nature of the regime. After all, even Joseph Stalin
and Adolf Hitler, the most ruthless of twentieth-century dictators, felt com-
pelled to justify the sacrifices they demanded of their people by connecting
those sacrifices to the grand purposes of “socialism in one country” and German
territorial expansion, respectively.
Recent policy documents from Washington illustrate a proclivity toward de-
fining national interests with studied imprecision and away from definitions
that are specific enough actually to guide policy or to engage the public in a
meaningful dialogue about the grand purposes that foreign policy might, and
perhaps should, serve. The national security strategy statements issued by presi-
dents more or less annually since the late 1980s are prime examples. These strat-
egy publications were legislatively mandated in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Thus it is technically accurate to char-
acterize the annual strategy reports as something that the executive branch pub-
lishes without enthusiasm and only because its collective arm has been twisted.
The 1986 legislation specified that the reports were to identify national inter-
ests and the strategies being pursued to achieve them, and that both classified
and unclassified reports were to be published.2 In other words, the legislation
makes explicit the congressional assumption that foreign policy is best made
and best overseen when national interests are clearly defined. The act required
unclassified reports in order to inform Congress as a whole and the public at
large. While an unclassified strategy report must be considerably less detailed than
its classified sibling, the unclassified documents that have been issued since 1986
have defined national interests so broadly as to raise doubts about whether the
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reports serve any constructive purpose in terms of educating or even informing the
public.
The December 2000 national security strategy report, which President Wil-
liam Clinton issued only a month before the inauguration of President George
W. Bush, is typical. A parting shot, a laundry list of bromides and unfulfilled
wishes, the 2000 report nevertheless resembles national security strategy state-
ments from the Clinton and earlier administrations in terms of how those state-
ments defined national interests.3 “Vital interests,” the 2000 report declared, “are
those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.
Among these are the physical security of our territory. . . . We will do what we
must to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, includ-
ing unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.”4
At one level, this “definition” simply restates the obvious. There can hardly be
any need to explain to the American public, to any other national government
on the planet, or even to any terrorist organization, that the U.S. government
considers military attacks on or within its sovereign borders injurious to vital
American interests. There may be no harm in restating the obvious, but neither
is any grand purpose served.
Furthermore, the excerpt above makes clear that this definition of “vital na-
tional interest” is intended to cover more than “merely” military attack by a hos-
tile state on the land occupied by the United States or expansion by another state
into territory over which the United States claims sovereignty. Plainly, if these
were the exclusive foci of the definition, there would hardly be any reason to say
that response “may involve the use of military force.” Neither would it be neces-
sary to indicate that threats to vital national interests can be envisioned in re-
sponse to which unilateral military action would be neither necessary nor
appropriate. Yet, as to what those situations might be, the report provides no in-
sight. In other words, this definition of a “vital national interest” provides clarity
where the point is obvious but is otherwise vacuous.
The protection of sovereign territory is only one of the national interests that
have been defined in overly general terms. Others include “the safety of our citi-
zens both at home and abroad,” “the economic well-being of our society,” and
“the protection of our critical infrastructure—including . . . vital human ser-
vices and government services—from disruption intended to cripple their oper-
ation.”5 These national interests are so broadly defined as to be the functional
equivalent of platitudes. They are catchphrases that no statesman or politician
would ever publicly reject—what would be the point?—but that nevertheless
play absolutely no meaningful role in the policy formulation process.
No policy maker in Washington would ever declare his or her indifference to
the safety of American citizens, to the protection of critical infrastructure, or to
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the nation’s economic well-being. Simply stating, however, that all three are de-
sirable says nothing about the directions that policy makers intend to take. Nor
do such statements do anything to inform or educate the public. Thus, on sev-
eral counts, the ways in which American national interests are being defined ap-
pear to defeat the purpose of Congress in requiring unclassified reports about
the goals and directions of the nation’s security strategy.
Admittedly, from the perspective of the statesman-navigator charting a par-
ticular foreign policy course, there may be practical reasons for preferring the
ambiguity of Delphi over the precision of science when it comes to publicly ex-
plaining the relationship between the national interests and the nation’s foreign
and defense policies. Policy formulation and implementation usually require
some level of agreement, compro-
mise, or political consensus—in
effect, marriages of convenience
between the executive branch of
government and other elements
of society. Such marriages are
considerably easier to arrange when the terms are defined only generally than
when they are set out in detail. Marriages of convenience between Congress and
the executive branch and between the Republican and Democratic parties, how-
ever temporary, can be essential to the foreign and defense policy-making pro-
cesses. They are, indeed, the basis of the shibboleth that politics should end at
the water’s edge.
A complicating factor in the era of globalization is that nongovernmental en-
tities—such as multinational corporations, humanitarian relief organizations,
vested interest groups, and coalitions of concerned citizens, each with its per-
spectives and issues—have proven that they can influence policy formulation by
lobbying and generating pressure through the media. If only through bitter ex-
perience, statesmen have come to understand that to express national interests
in detailed, specific terms is often to invite political challenge from entities
whose special interests are adversely affected by some nuance.
Another reason for the practitioner’s preference for general descriptions of
national interest is that specific formulations can have unintended conse-
quences. The most infamous example is North Korea’s attack on South Korea in
1950 after Washington had indicated that the latter was outside the geographic
zone of vital U.S. national interests. Such instances can be cited as proof that am-
biguity serves a strategically useful purpose; nonetheless, it is not always the wis-
est course. Indeed, ambiguity appears as likely as specificity to send the kind of
inadvertent signals that creates crises. It is, for example, conceivable that until
the air war on Serbia in 2000, Slobodan Milosevic and the other perpetrators of
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human rights abuses in the Balkans were emboldened by the apparent uncer-
tainty of the United States as to its national interests in the former Yugoslavia.
Further, it seems quite likely that the platitudinous expressions by Washington
and other governments in the mid-1990s about the importance of human rights
were actually interpreted in Rwanda as signals of indifference toward genocide
in sub-Saharan Africa.
A negative consequence of another order is the shallowness of the political al-
liances negotiated among Congress, the White House, Democratic and Republi-
can activists, and special-interest groups on the basis of vaguely defined and
ambiguously prioritized national interests. Marriages of convenience can very
quickly mutate into separations of convenience—perhaps a minor problem when
the issues themselves merit only modest and brief bursts of energy from the body
politic, but potentially of great significance for matters that are serious and lasting.
Over the long term, ambiguity imposes a heavy opportunity cost in terms of
forfeited occasions in which the public might have been educated about grand
purposes—enduring issues and long-term objectives being addressed by the
foreign policy establishment. The American public is famously uninterested in
foreign affairs, and this indifference presumably contributes to its passive accep-
tance of deliberately vague definitions of national interests. Whether such ambi-
guity is the “chicken” or the “egg” of the public’s unconcern, democracy suffers
when leaders continually defer serious dialogue about how national interests
should be defined and prioritized.
The foreign policy establishment has periodically, although not recently, en-
gaged the public and Congress in serious discourse about the national interest;
and when it has, enduring public and legislative support for specific grand strat-
egies has resulted. This occurred, for example, during the early 1980s, at the end
of the Jimmy Carter administration and the beginning of the Ronald Reagan ad-
ministration, when there was a broad public debate about the level of U.S. de-
fense spending needed in light of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its
bloc. The result was public support for a multiyear, across-the-board increase in
defense spending and for a more assertive foreign policy. Earlier in the Cold War
there had been a similar dialogue involving the public and Congress; in the end,
the policies of containment and nuclear deterrence were formulated and the
Nato treaty was approved. Each of these strategies required and was to receive
decades-long political support by the public and financial support by the pub-
lic’s representatives in Congress.
Another example occurred during the years after World War I, when Presi-
dent Wilson tried to convince the public and Congress that membership in the
League of Nations was in the national interest of the United States. Wilson failed,
but the public debate had lasting effects. For almost two decades the public and
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its elected representatives supported a foreign policy that minimized defense
spending and commitments outside the hemisphere, particularly commitments
with military implications. Indeed, the fact that the outcome of the debate was
different than Wilson intended demonstrates the value of serious public dis-
course in the first place. Had the president been able to attach the nation to the
League by executive fiat, its membership would have been futile. The mood of
Congress and the public would have denied Wilson support for the expansive
foreign and defense strategies that he envisioned as part and parcel of the League
of Nations ideal.
A public debate about national interests after the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon was, of course, unnecessary, at least with respect
to mobilizing public support for homeland security programs and the war
against the perpetrators of the attacks and their supporters. There are, however,
other aspects of the war on terrorism for which public and congressional sup-
port is less certain, because their relationships to the 11 September attacks are
indirect.
For example, the direction that the war on terrorism will take after Afghani-
stan is by no means clear—beyond the fact that it will be a long-term effort. One
need not agree that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are part of an “axis of evil” to
recognize that President Bush’s
critics have failed to acknowledge
that publicly labeling rogue states
is a positive step in terms of debat-
ing and defining more rigorously
than usual national interests with
respect to each. In the process of
engaging Congress, and through
it the public, in a substantive dialogue about the nation’s interests in preventing
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction developed by rogue
states, the “axis of evil” epithet is preferable to platitudes about the survival and
vitality of the United States.
Other issues with indirect but important relationships to homeland security
and to the future direction of the war on terrorism are the Arab-Israeli peace
process and the concept of “nation building,” assistance in the restoration of col-
lapsed states to viability on the basis of democratic institutions. With respect to
the latter, judgments will be required over the next several years about the role
the United States should play in nation building in order to prevent future ter-
rorists from finding platforms in the no-man’s-lands of ineffective or failing
states. Nation building is not a science. It is an art that takes effort and invest-
ment over extended periods of time. In Bosnia, for example, nation building has
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been under way since 1996, but the end of the project is not in sight. Should the
role of the United States be direct or indirect? Should the work be led by the
United Nations or by some multilateral organization, perhaps built for the pur-
pose? The answers to these and other questions would seem to depend at least in
part on how U.S. national interests are defined and prioritized. Further, public
and congressional support for this complex and expensive task may depend
heavily on the depth of the American people’s understanding of and commit-
ment to those interests.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is related to the war on terrorism and homeland se-
curity because Islamic extremists, and many Muslims generally, condemn the
United States for enabling Israel to defend itself and maintain its hold over occu-
pied territory. Since at least 1973, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shut-
tled between Arab and Israeli capitals to negotiate a cease-fire and withdrawal of
forces after the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, the United States has invested con-
siderable time, energy, and resources in pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Presidents Carter and Clinton, in the 1970s and 1990s, re-
spectively, were personally engaged in the peace process; during the Reagan and
George Bush administrations, the secretaries of state actively promoted settle-
ment. Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, negotiated what turned out to
be a short-lived peace settlement in 1983; Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker,
shuttled to the Middle East eleven times in a single year (1991) and hosted an
Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid.
There were, of course, ebbs and flow in the level of direct U.S. engagement in
the peace process, due to judgments at the time about the practical prospects for
success. What is remarkable is rather the consistently high level of effort over
three decades despite major shifts in the geostrategic environment. U.S. shuttle
diplomacy, forward military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and sub-
stantial foreign aid investment in Israel and Egypt started during the Cold War.
Today the United States is no longer vying with a rival superpower, and its na-
tional interests in the region are presumably either different or, at the very least,
less at risk. U.S. strategies, nevertheless, appear to have changed hardly at all.
High-level emissaries still shuttle to the Middle East in attempts to mediate; the
United States gives more foreign aid to both Israel and Egypt than to any other
country; and forward military presence in the eastern Mediterranean continues.
The reason is that such enmity and distrust exist between the Palestinians and
the Israelis that no true settlement will ever be reached without long-term com-
mitment by the United States. This almost certainly will entail nation-building
assistance to the Palestinians, even more foreign aid to Israel (and perhaps to
Egypt and other moderate Arab states), and either security guarantees or the ac-
tual interposition of American peacekeepers. It may be hard to maintain steady
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levels of political support for such sustained efforts if they are “marketed” to the
American public and Congress on the basis of catchphrases and buzzwords
about national interests.
There may be other policy areas that will also require long-term support from
the public and Congress. It is not necessary to identify them here. The point is
that for thoroughly practical reasons—specifically, the mobilization and main-
tenance of resources and commitment for projects that require protracted ef-
fort—it would be wise to engage the public and Congress in a meaningful
dialogue about the national interests that may be involved. Such a dialogue is
simply not possible when national interests are so generally defined that they
mean all things to all people. So in this regard, for the future direction of the war
against terrorism, the president’s “axis of evil” speech was a useful, clarifying
step. The congressional requirement for annual unclassified national security
reports, in contrast, has proven to have little value in furthering the debate. Con-
gress would do well to consider whether the public interest would be better
served if national security reports were required only once in a presidential
term—on the assumption that interests and strategies do not, or at least should
not, change annually.
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